Demosthenes, Speeches (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose; rhetoric] [word count] [lemma count] [Dem.].
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20.4Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us.

20.5Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all. 20.6There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness, note but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it.

20.7Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens?

20.8Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing—laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness—there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming. 20.9When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty? 20.10For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money—yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint. note As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for Athens is incurring the three worst reproaches—that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful.

20.11Next, men of Athens, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the Piraeus. note But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment. 20.12When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it.

20.13The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is—truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described. 20.14I say, then, that it would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man—and he may be, for aught I know—he cannot excel her in character.



Demosthenes, Speeches (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose; rhetoric] [word count] [lemma count] [Dem.].
<<Dem. 20.1 Dem. 20.8 (Greek) >>Dem. 20.19

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